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The depiction of human identity in the pop-science futurology of engineer/inventor Ray 
Kurzweil, the speculative-robotics of Carnegie Mellon roboticist Hans Moravec and the 
physics of Tulane University mathematics professor Frank Tipler elevate technology, 
especially information technology, to a point of ultimate significance.  For these three figures, 
information technology offers the potential means by which the problem of human and 
cosmic finitude can be rectified.  Although Moravec‟s vision of intelligent robots, Kurzweil‟s 
hope for immanent human immorality, and Tipler‟s description of human-like von Neumann 
probe colonising the very material fabric of the universe, may all appear to be nothing more 
than science fictional musings, they raise genuine questions as to the relationship between 
science, technology, and religion as regards issues of personal and cosmic eschatology.  In an 
attempt to correct what I  see as the „cybernetic-totalism‟ inherent in these „techno-
theologies‟, I will argue for a theology of technology, which seeks to interpret technology 
hermeneutically and grounds human creativity in the broader context of divine creative 
activity.   
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This article will analyze the posthuman future described within speculative science.  It 
will examine how information technology has become a conveyance for ultimate concern, 
inasmuch as it contributes to a techno-theology where human material culture serves as the 
foundation for eschatological hope.  A techno-theology, unlike a theology of technology, 
grounds theological aspirations (e.g. hope for a better life, concern over human destiny, 
notions of the good) in technological realities.  In contrast, a theology of technology seeks to 
situate one‟s interaction with technology within ecclesially embodied and historically 
mediated theological narratives.   
Below, the pop-science futurology of engineer/inventor Ray Kurzweil, the speculative-
robotics of Carnegie Mellon roboticist Hans Moravec and the physics of Tulane University 
mathematics professor Frank Tipler will be analysed with regards to their techno-theological 
eschatology.  I will argue that within their posthuman speculative science, present and future 
technologies are viewed as the means of achieving ultimate salvation for both the cosmos and 
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the individual person. Yet, despite the prominence of these themes, and despite their frequent 
mention within contemporary posthuman literature, their work has received surprisingly little 
critical reflection within academic theology.  The article hopes to rectify this abeyance, by 
exploring their work with specific interest in engaging with the latent theological implications 
of their thought.  
As will be discussed, posthuman speculative science reflects an implied reductionistic 
philosophical anthropology.  The complexity of the human subject –  her spirituality, 
materiality, and sociality – is perceived as being reducible to a collection of patterns which 
can be decoded and re-embodied in whatever substrate a given future technology provides.  
Although Moravec‟s vision of intelligent robots, Kurzweil‟s hope for immanent human 
immorality, and Tipler‟s description of human-like von Neumann machines colonising the 
very material fabric of the universe, may all appear to be nothing more than science fictional 
musings, they raise genuine questions as to the relationship between scientific aspirations, 
technology and theology.  Though I had originally assumed that the problem of posthuman 
speculative science was primarily its implicit acceptance of a reductionistic philosophical 
anthropology, in pursuing my research further I realised that although posthuman speculative 
science does promote radical reductionism, the more pertinent theological issue surfaces 
when one examines the role played by technology within posthuman thought, as a means of 
conveying ultimate concern.   
In light of the admittedly obscure nature of this topic, before proceeding with our analysis 
of Kurzweil, Moravec, and Tipler, three concepts must first be defined.  We must provide a 
definition for technology, speculative science, and posthumanism, and briefly discuss the 
relationship between posthuman speculative science and the recent history of information 
technology, cybernetics and artificial intelligence research. 
Defining Technology 
Technologies are objects which extend human agency and will whilst remaining 
ontologically differentiated from human being.  I argue that the meaning of technology can 
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only be found at the nexus of a given technology‟s invention and application.  There is 
therefore no „essence of technology‟ nor „essence of technologies‟ as talk of essences implies 
an immutability which is utterly foreign to the ever changing forms of technological 
development.
i
  Technologies operate within prescribed notions of causality which are 
imposed upon them by their makers or users.  They are intended for particular tasks and do 
these tasks in service to human will.  Technologies are neither good nor evil, although the 
systems within which they operate – and the operators which establish and work within such  
systems and technologies – can be.  My definition of technology seeks to wrestle 
responsibility and control away from the objects of technology themselves, and to place the 
onus of ethical liability firmly back in the hands of a given technology‟s human users and 
designers.  I advocate approaching technology hermeneutically, where the meaning of a 
technology is discovered within an analysis of its situation.  Likewise, its ethical weight is to 
be determined by one‟s self-reflexive examination of one‟s technology-use.   
Given the above definition, how can something as straightforward as technology ever 
give rise to something as symbol-laden as discourse regarding ultimate concern?  Given the 
transparent and predictable nature of technology, it would appear that technology and 
symbolic discourse share a natural antinomy.  One could say that the contemporary situation 
is one that could be typified by a gradual decrease in the value of symbolic systems of 
discourse, corresponding to increased technical literacy in culture (Dillistone 1973, 6).  
Dillistone argues that symbols in a technological world loose their power for two reasons: a) 
shifting changes in the role of religion in explaining the meaning and origin of the cosmos, 
and b) the move away from a platonic metaphysic where earthly phenomena can be traced 
back to a perfect transcendental form (Dillistone 1973, 6).  In contrast to symbols, 
technologies for Dillistone appear to operate as unambiguous signs which point to „direct 
correspondence‟ between the thing being represented and its representation (Dillistone 1973, 
163).  Whereas symbols retain a high degree of ambiguity and rely upon interpretation in 
order for their underlying meaning to emerge, „[s]igns do not require anything transcendent or 
ultimate to under gird them‟(Dillistone 1973, 168).  The symbol is open to interpretation, yet 
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the sign closes-off possible future discourse by unambiguously pointing to the reality which it 
represents (Dillistone 1973, 163).   
Technologies-cum-signs point to no other reality than the causal effect to which a 
technology has been designed or applied.  However, and perhaps paradoxically, both signs 
and technologies can become conveyances for the symbolic when their unambiguous 
meanings become obscured by their ambiguous applications.  The relative clarity of a sign‟s 
message depends entirely upon the context within which the sign is read.  As the Messianic 
secret in Mark‟s Gospel indicates, the symbolic significance of the „signs‟ indicating the 
coming of the Kingdom, can only be accurately read by those in possession of the right 
hermeneutic.
ii
  Likewise, the native un-ambiguity of technology becomes obfuscated when 
the effect of technology upon its object is confused with the affect of technology upon the 
subject.  Technology itself may be both neutral and unambiguous, but its application is 
neither.  Thus, to understand the cultural ambiguities of technology‟s use, one must 
differentiate between the effect of a technology (as regards its causality) and the affect of a 
technology (as regards its significance). 
The effect of technology is caused by the design and operation of technologies imposed 
upon material objects by technology‟s creators and/or operators.  The affect of technology is 
caused by the subjective appraisal of such technologies, where the awe and wonder of a 
technology‟s abilities eclipses the brilliance of a technology‟s creator or user.  To use an 
example borrowed from Paul Tillich, it is entirely appropriate for one to experience a sense of 
awe in the presence of great seafaring ships, airplanes or other objects of technological 
production, but it is inappropriate when the „eros‟ which is directed towards the „technical 
gestalt‟ becomes fixated on the technical object rather than the combination of subject and 
object which is combined within the whole of a technology (Tillich 1964, 274).  To focus on 
the affect of technology is to merely praise the creation,  to make the object itself the entity 
which is the source of one‟s admiration.    
It is precisely this problem of misappropriated affection, or a technologically influenced 
concupiscence, that plagues the examples of the speculative sciences below.  Regarded 
 6 
hermeneutically, with a concern for their place within the human situation, the information 
technologies at play within speculative science would reflect the humanist interests of early 
cyberneticists who sought to use technologies, marshalled by culturally determined strong-
values, to better society (Wiener 1948, 37-39; 187-8).  Uncoupled from either governance or 
situated human need, the technologies that are speculated upon below, give rise to symbols 
and myths that offer immanently realisable solutions to existential hopes.  Hence, the 
relatively straightforward sign-like behaviour of technology becomes obscured by the 
symbols which arise from a primarily affective reading of technology.  In the speculative 
sciences, this mythological significance will lead to an inauthentic expression of ultimate 
concern, where technologies themselves point to what is mistakenly perceived to be a more 
authentic form of subjectivity.   
Excurses into IT/Cybernetics 
As early as 1964, Norbert Wiener, one of the foremost 20th century cyberneticists, argued 
that cybernetics „impinged‟ upon religion.  The three principal points of convergence for 
Wiener were: 1) the creation of machines which can learn; 2) the creation of machines which 
can reproduce themselves; and 3) the creation of machines which can engage in mixed-use 
applications, that is, machines which are integrated into social, cultural and biological life 
(Wiener 1964, 11).  Despite his assertions, the impingement which Wiener refers to is not to 
religion or theology per se – nowhere does he argue that computers could themselves become 
or replace God, nor does he posit that they can or should become objects of veneration – 
rather, Wiener describes „religious‟ impingement in terms of technology‟s potential ability to 
destabilise or challenge how subjectivity is traditionally understood within religion (and in the 
case of Wiener‟s definition of religion, the Judeo-Christian tradition).  Wiener would argue 
that by destabilising traditional views of the subject, cybernetics or information technologies 
undermine many of the assumptions about self, world, and society which directly relate to the 
creation of a theological system of belief.  For Wiener, inasmuch as the doctrine of the imago 
Dei preserved the unique creative purview of the Divine (in relationship to humanity), by 
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undermining human uniqueness, cybernetic technologies also undermine divine creative 
sovereignty.  If humans are neither functionally unique (points 1 & 2) nor ontologically 
unique (point 3), for Wiener, the divine ceases to be magisterially unique in his creativity.  
Though this argument may seem somewhat crass Wiener‟s God & Golem, Inc. represents an 
important step in the religious critique of contemporary information technologies.  Namely, 
Wiener‟s work points to the common ground shared by theological-self knowledge and the 
self-knowledge derived from one‟s encounter with culture, and specifically, the culture made 
possible by human technology.  He argued that unless the study of cybernetics was carried out 
with humility and a concern for preserving the priority of the „human‟ within its study of 
systems and organisms, cybernetics would become the sole purveyor of knowledge about 
world, God, and self.   
Concurrent with the publication of Wiener‟s admonition for a humanist caution within his 
discipline, computer scientist Marvin Minsky began working toward an understanding of 
neural networks, electronic correlates to the human brain, and the pursuit of artificial 
intelligence (Minsky 1967). Whereas cybernetics in Wiener tended towards a realistic-
interpretation of computer technologies and pursued inter-disciplinary dialogues between 
cybernetics as the so-called „command-and-control science‟ and other soft-sciences; artificial 
intelligence research typified by Minsky‟s Computation: Finite and Infinite Machines, has 
promoted an idealised-vision of technology, which contributes to an ethos, if not a culture, 
that seeks to use computer science as a way of addressing topics ranging from the nature of 
cognition, the future of humanity, and the destiny of the cosmos.  Though cybernetics still 
exists as an actively pursued scientific discipline, the ethos surrounding AI has prevailed as 
the cultural appropriation of information technology, as typified by posthuman speculative 
science. 
Though often misunderstood as synonymous terms, research in the field of artificial 
intelligence differs drastically from cybernetics.  Cybernetics, as envisioned by Wiener, is a 
descriptive discipline which seeks to uncover how feedback systems (natural or otherwise) 
work within the world.  It is a discipline that is keenly aware of the place of the subjective 
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observer within the systems which s/he is observing.  By contrast, AI is a prescriptive 
discipline which seeks to employ computational models as the basis for cognition.  It is a 
discipline that seeks to remove the subjective observer from the task of discovery by 
replacing the subject through the implementation of computational abstractions.
iii
   
Today, despite the presence of cybernetics, cyberspace, cyborgs and cybersex within our 
collective vocabularies, we live in an age dominated by the inherent philosophies of 
cybernetics‟ close relative, artificial intelligence.  Thus, rather than using cybernetic 
methodologies to better understand feedback systems, AI research has sought to use 
information technology to better understand a contrived and technologically-mediated model 
of human intelligence.  In sum, the ethos surrounding AI research promotes a kind of 
„cybernetic totalism‟, whereby objects in the world are made to seem more real when they 
receive mediation through, or representation by, computer systems (Lanier 2000).  We will 
note below that it is precisely this disposition towards IT that promotes the posthuman 
subjectivities in Kurzweil, Moravec and Tipler, leading ultimately towards their techno-
theological eschatology 
What is Speculative Science? 
The term „speculative science‟ is used in this article to refer to a form of scientific 
reflection where the future of scientific discovery is the primary object.   This may be sound 
like „science fiction‟, but one should be careful to differentiate between the role played by 
imagination within science fiction and the role played by speculation within speculative 
science.  The imagination in science fiction is patently fictive, and is employed primarily for 
the purpose of entertainment, though it can be regarded as a form of social critique (Broderick 
1995).  The fictive imagination is not made dependent upon technology, real or otherwise, for 
the communication of its story.  Technology, unencumbered by history or fact within the 
fictive world, forms a connection to the reader‟s present as established from the perspective of 
the fictive future (as if looking back on to he present from afar) rather than from the 
perspective of the present (as if looking ahead to the future).  Thus, the imagination of 
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posthuman science fiction is an imagination of the future which reaches back into the present, 
and in so doing confronts the present with a picture of otherness that encourages reflective 
critique.  By contrast, speculation, at least in the way in which the term is employed in 
posthuman speculative science, is grounded in a familiarity with the present which projects 
onto the future an informed guess of what could be in light of what is.   
Perhaps speculative science would be better understood if juxtaposed with the well-
established scientific practice of the thought experiment, where a line of questioning is 
pursued en lieu of empirical observation..  The well known example of Schrödinger's cat is a 
thought experiment which describes the problem of simultaneity in quantum states.  No one 
would ever argue that Schrödinger's cat actually existed as simultaneously alive and dead,
iv
 
yet in the context of speculative science an outlandish claim of this ilk could be made.  
Speculative science could argue that our knowledge of quantum mechanics is presently 
incomplete, but perhaps in the future simultaneity will be more fully understood, whereby 
there could be such things as alive-dead cats.  Though crippled by the possibilities of science 
and technology in the present, speculative science holds out hope for the future as the place 
where the mysteries of science can be resolved, and the limits of technology can be exceeded.   
Unlike the role played by imagination in posthuman science fiction, speculative science 
grounds its future on a trajectory that is set by the present.  It represents an unwavering faith 
in the myth of progress (in this case, scientific and technological progress) which prompts the 
speculative scientists described below to read through their formidable scientific expertise, a 
hope for a technologically improved future.  Whereas thought experiments can usefully 
produce theories that may later be proven or disproved, it would seem that speculative science 
only promotes a futurological outlook which invests the future, as an extension of the present,  
with utmost significance.  Speculative science looks to the future for its ultimate goal and in 
so doing views the present only in terms of its ability to procure this future goal. 
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What is Posthumanism? 
Posthumanism follows speculative science into the future and regards the future destiny 
of human being to be the ground for present-day human identity.  It is the belief  that through 
a union of human technical ability and human will, human beings will progress towards (or be 
the progenitors of) the next stage of human evolution, resulting in the „post-human‟.  
Although, for the purpose of this article my concern with posthumanism is primarily centred 
on the more theological dimension of posthuman discourse, the term also connotes post-
Humanism in the sense of a critique of Humanist philosophy.  The posthuman, cyborg or so-
called „non-modern‟ critique of humanism cites the historical use of technology and its 
ubiquitous presence in contemporary life to argue that human goals, the „good life‟, society, 
and value can only be understood in terms of the human use and creation of technology 
(Feenberg 2002, 28-30).  To this end, posthumanism as anti-humanism argues that human 
being can only be understood in terms of hybridisation, rather than in terms of the „purely‟ 
human.  Whereas humanism tends to advance the cause of the individual and his or her place 
within the community, posthumanism is characteristically oriented towards the dissolution of 
the individual in favour of a networked vision of society (Latour 1987, 258).  Despite the anti-
humanism of posthuman theory, I argue that posthuman discourse –  whether posthumanism 
as anti-humanism or posthumanism as futurology – is simply an extension of the broader 
posthuman condition which is identified as a striving after that which is beyond the human (as 
in Homo sapiens) and not simply that which is beyond Humanism, as a philosophy.   
In practice, posthumanism is facilitated by a desire to improve upon the human condition 
by implementing advanced technologies which generally fall under the category of cybernetic 
or information technologies.  In science fiction novels such as Philip K. Dick‟s Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep?, or William Gibson‟s Neuromancer, information technology is used 
to confuse human subjectivity by contrasting present-day images of the human with 
posthuman scenarios.  In films such as The Matrix trilogy, eXistenZ, or Lawnmower Man, 
information technology mediates reality to such an extent that the fusion of humans and their 
technologies represents a next step in human evolution.  In critical theory and feminism, the 
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cyborg is employed as an amalgamation of cybernetic technologies and organic life, which 
destabilizes assumptions regarding gender, sexuality, and control, as set within what is 
regarded to be a technological age.  In terms of speculative science and engineering, robotics, 
strong-AI, von Neumann machines and computer simulations of consciousness all feature in 
the posthuman vision of a post-biological future.   
A common theme in the myth of posthuman speculative science is the belief that 
advanced forms of information technology will, in the future, be able to accommodate radical 
forms of life extension.  The ability to employ technology to stave off death as long as 
possible has given the posthuman speculative scientists noted below a sense of confidence in 
their craft‟s ability to bring an ultimate solution to the problem of finitude, especially when 
cast in terms of personal mortality.  As we shall see, however, the possibility of eliminating 
death is rather different than the possibility of systemic redemption or salvation (Fukuyama 
2003, 67, 71).   
Posthuman Speculative Scientists 
Above, we have defined technology as an non-essential cultural entity which must be 
approach hermeneutically, explored the history of 20
th
 century information technologies, 
defined speculative science as a future-oriented form of scientific reflection, and described 
posthumanism as an unwavering faith in future human-technology co-emergence.  For the 
remainder of the article we will engage with specific examples of posthuman speculative 
science in Moravec, Tipler, and Kurzweil, noting the techno-theological eschatology revealed 
by each.   
Moravec’s Mind Children and the Future of Human Evolution 
Hans Moravec, a research professor at the Robotics Institute of the Carnegie Melon 
University, specialises in autonomous robot mobility.  An established and highly regarded 
robotics engineer with an extensive list of patents and academic publications to his name; 
Moravec‟s work is driven by a desire to see autonomous self-mobile robots commercially 
available by the end of the decade.
v
  Despite the highly pragmatic nature of his primary area 
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of research, Moravec‟s more speculative work centres on the broadly sweeping implications 
of evolving robotic intelligence and dexterity.  In his principle writings on speculative 
science, Mind Children (1988) and Robot (1999), Moravec describes the technical obstacles 
which must be overcome in order for the posthuman evolution of robots to ensue.  He 
describes with great clarity the trajectory of developments within information technology 
which he believes will lead to the creation of artificially intelligent robots.  In addition to 
creating autonomous forms of artificial life, Moravec believes that robot evolution will 
eventually provide the technology for the re-instantiation of human consciousness into a 
computerised and robotic medium.   
Consistent with other contemporary applications of robot technology, from the Mars 
Rover to industrial manufacture, the robots being developed currently by Moravec are 
intended to be put to use in environments where humans have traditionally been unable to 
thrive.  Such robots liberate their human users and designers from the lethal repercussions of 
fate or bad judgment.  As devices which extend the horizon of human action, Moravec views 
robots as more than tools for the manipulation of the physical world, but as devices which 
enable their human operators (or programmers) to skirt around the basic limits of human 
finitude.  By plunging robots into outer-space, distant planets, or even in the forges and 
assembly lines of contemporary industry, he would argue that human will and agency are 
extended into domains which are only knowable through their technological mediations.  
Seen as extensions of human being, robots in the present are only quantitatively distinct from 
what Moravec describes as a „postbiological‟ future. 
Yet Moravec‟s vision of future robotic technology hopes for more than the extension of 
agency and will, but a time when robotic „life‟ will surpass human life as the more durable 
and malleable incarnation of human evolution.:  „What awaits is not oblivion but rather a 
future which, from our present vantage point, is best described by the words “postbiological” 
or even “supernatural”.  It is a world in which the human race has been swept away by the 
tide of cultural change, usurped by its own artificial potency‟ (Moravec 1988, 1). 
 13 
Moravec views this future as the consummation of humanity‟s historical courtship with 
technology.  From the first stone tools to the most advanced forms of robotics and artificial 
intelligence, humanity has lived as a hybrid species, whose will and agency have been partly 
instantiated within a biological body and partly instantiated within an ever developing 
technological body.  Put tersely, Moravec describes present-day humanity as „uncomfortable 
halfbreeds.‟  Thus in the future, faced with an increasingly inhospitable environment and an 
unquenchable desire for longevity, humanity will be forced to divest itself from its natural 
situation in the world and surrender completely to a purely technological mode of being, 
created by humanity for humanity.   
Moravec‟s primary reason for pursuing robotic technology and artificial intelligence as 
the ultimate solution to the problem of human finitude, reflects what he sees as the inherently 
inhospitable nature of contemporary technological life.  Humans live in a world which 
outpaces the finite limitations of the human physiology and psychology.  Moravec writes: 
We have a Stone Age brain, but we don‟t live in the Stone Age anymore. We were 
fitted by evolution to live in tribal villages of up to 200 relatives and friends, finding 
and hunting our food. We now live in cities of millions of strangers, supporting 
ourselves with unnatural tasks we have to be trained to accomplish, like animals who 
have been forced to learn circus tricks (Moravec 1995). 
Accordingly, the only way for humanity to endure the speed and the depth of contemporary 
existence is to increasingly rely on technologies to mediate the world in a way which 
compensates for the limitations of our „Stone Age brain.‟  The externalising of cognitive 
function in the use of computers to think with and for humans, coupled with the extension of 
human activity through the use of robots, prosthetics and other tools, is for Moravec the first 
step towards an eventual abandonment of the physical biological body for a new body which 
will be crafted with the needs of the technological world in mind.  Despite the many changes 
in temporality, spatiality, sociality and interiority which would accompany a radical 
reinstantiation of human being into posthuman physiology (Moravec 1988, 110, 114), 
Moravec would argue that posthuman beings are our „mind children‟, descended from the 
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human drive to self-perfection, and related to us by sharing with us our basic intelligence.  
For Moravec, the space between the human and the posthuman is a continuum of human 
evolution coupled with technological development.   
Resurrection into Continued Finality  
Moravec has developed a theme which will be echoed below in the other two posthuman 
speculative scientists.  It is an image of a technologically mediated eternal kingdom.  Like the 
Christian Kingdom of God which exists as a partial reality in the present and a full reality in 
the future, the techno-Kingdom of posthuman speculative science is read as an emerging 
reality which will be consummated in a not-too-distant future.  Though a posthuman 
eschatology attempts to wrestle with similar themes present also within Christian eschatology, 
a Christian eschatology is ever aware that the fulfilment of its hope lies in the hands of the 
God who is in control of history, in contrast to a posthuman eschatology which places the 
onus of control upon human technologies.   
Furthermore, Moravec‟s posthuman future raises serious question regarding one‟s 
persisting identity after having been resurrected into a cybernetic body.  Like so much 
Christian theology which has appealed to a dualism between body and soul to „reasonably‟ 
argue for the persistence of identity following death; posthuman speculative science also 
appeals to a notion of dualism which separates the body and the mind as two distinct entities.  
Thus, for Moravec, the „essence‟ of humanity is the human mind; an epiphenomenon which is 
produced by the brain to functions as the body‟s software.  As software, mind is as 
transferable (portable and interoperable) as any other piece of software that I might load onto 
a disk and move from one computer to the next.  For Moravec, neither the body, nor the 
world, nor community, affect the subjective experience of mind.  Indeed, any subjective 
experience is merely „an abstract property shared by all patterns‟, meaning that whether 
instantiated in a computer or in my own body, „a person would feel the same‟ (Moravec 1988, 
178).  In order for Moravec to advocate a posthuman future with some form of continuity 
between one‟s old embodiment in the flesh and one‟s new embodiment in a technological-
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body, he must reject any notion that the physical body is somehow required for human 
consciousness. He asserts that if the patterns and processes of the mind are preserved, „I am 
preserved.  The rest is mere jelly‟ (Moravec 1988, 117).  Rather than the body, it is patterns 
which constitute identity and codes which define persons; thus humanity is ultimately 
reducible to a collection of bits and bytes.   
His blind belief in information technology as the means by which future humanity will 
experience radical life extension, confirms him as a cybernetic totalist who believes that 
reality is better understood through cybernetic mediation.  Though philosophically we can 
dismiss Moravec‟s optimism, and perhaps even technologically we could undermine the 
feasibility of his plans, a more pressing question is one which explores the intent behind such 
a blatantly eschatological reading of future information technologies.  .  Indeed, Moravec 
singles a trend followed by the other posthuman speculative scientists discussed in this essay, 
by investing present-day technologies with eschatological significance.  In so doing, 
posthuman speculative scientists aim to fulfil existential concerns with immanently realisable 
solutions.   
Tipler’s Immortality as the Colonisation of the Cosmos  
The technological landscape of the posthuman future described in Moravec (above) and 
Kurzweil (below) finds an interesting compliment in Tulane University physicist Frank 
Tipler‟s Physics of Immortality. Like Kurzweil and Moravec, Tipler takes up the possibility of 
a posthuman future through the rubric of technology-enabled life extension.  Human finitude 
– and indeed, for Tipler, cosmic finitude – is an existential concern to which information 
technology may provide an ultimate solution.  Rather brashly he begins his study by arguing 
that „theology is a branch of physics and that physicists can infer by calculation the existence 
of God and the likelihood of the resurrection of the dead to eternal life…‟ (Tipler 1994, iv).  
In an attempt to arrive at a „universal‟ theological language, Tipler appeals to what he sees to 
be a sense of universal eschatological hopes that are reflected in all the „great religions of the 
world‟.  This is the starting point for his physical theology.  Yet, rather than turning to 
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transcendental symbols or religious discourse, Tipler seeks to ground his eschatology in 
scientifically verifiable and technologically feasible realties.    
As was the case with Moravec, in order to promote a form of life extension where one‟s 
subjective experiences and consciousness can be instantiated in a substrate different from 
one‟s own physical body, Tipler appeals to a pattern-based understanding of identity.  
Accordingly, one‟s mind is understood as a composite of one‟s neuropathology.  Echoing 
Moravec he writes, „the pattern is what‟s important, not the substrate‟(Tipler 1994, 127).  
Human mind can exist forever, assuming that the machines which house and embody the 
human mind can last forever as well (Tipler 1994, 125).  Again like Moravec, embodiment – 
which is contingent upon ever-changing biological and technological realities – is not 
constitutive of the individual.  Tipler defines sentient life as follows: 
I claim that a “living being” is any entity which codes information (in the physics 
sense of this word) with the information coded being preserved by natural selection.  
Thus, “life” is a form of information processing, and the human mind – and the 
human soul – is a very complex computer program.  Specifically a “person “is 
defined to be a computer program which can pass the Turing test… (Tipler 1994, 
125) 
Making „life‟ synonymous with information processing, allows Tipler to reduce the 
complexities of subjectivity into a form which can be readily modelled by computers,  and 
therefore easily replicated within other information technology devices, of which the human 
mind is but a simple form.  The posthuman future for Tipler is filled with Voyager-like space 
probes that contain and process living posthuman human intelligences.  These devices, which 
in the future will be launched from our planet as the natural end of our Sun comes to its close, 
and will seek to transform the material fabric of the universe into a cosmic posthuman 
information processing device.   For Tipler, it is only natural that the „next stage of intelligent 
life would be quite literally information processing machines‟ (Tipler 1994, 218).  
His eschatological speculations are grounded in a technological myth which resists any 
appeal to a transcendent divinity (Tipler 1994, 125).  He seeks to make „heaven as real as the 
electron‟ (Tipler 1994, xv) by appealing to the most „up-to-date knowledge of modern 
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mathematics and physics‟ (Tipler 1994, xvi).  This approach differentiates Tipler from 
Moravec or Kurzweil, inasmuch as Tipler aims at exploring the long-range implications of 
posthuman life-extension by casting a technological eschatology as both individual and 
cosmic destiny.  He argues that in order for humanity to fully embrace its own self-made 
immortality, the cosmos must be implicated in this pursuit (Tipler 1994, xiii).  
To achieve immortality in the face of certain cosmic finality, what for Tipler is the real 
challenge of posthuman speculative science,  requires one to devise a way to persist the 
„computer program‟ of the human soul in an incorruptible medium.  But how can anything 
created in a finite cosmos truly be incorruptible?  Even beyond the death of our own solar 
system, there exists yet an even more problematic boundary, which in Tipler‟s physics is 
termed the „Omega Point‟ – the end of the Cosmos itself.   For Tipler, the greatest obstacle to 
immortality is the collapse of the universe and the return to singularity – the moment wherein 
all matter and energy converge to a single infinitesimal point (Tipler 1994, 154).   Yet 
Tipler‟s „Omega Point‟ is strikingly different from the use of the same concept by early 20th 
century French theologian and palaeontologist, Teilhard de Chardin.  Teilhard understood the 
Omega Point to be the end of cosmic history, both in terms of its completion/fulfilment and 
its ultimate goal (DeLashmutt 2005).  The Omega Point was seen to be a term roughly 
synonymous with the being of Jesus Christ, and not dissimilar to the role of Ultimate Concern 
in Paul Tillich‟s theology (as ground of being) or Kingdom of God in Pannenberg‟s (as 
prolepsis of the cosmic end).  Tipler‟s use of the concept is divested of Teilhard‟s theological 
teleology, as for Tipler Omega Point is nothing more than the absolute boundary of space and 
time, the fixed horizon at the end of existence. For Teilhard, surviving the Omega Point 
meant the fusion of spirit and matter into Christ.  For Tipler, there is no spiritual undercurrent, 
only a mathematical formula which seeks to prove that at the point of singularity one could 




Tipler in Dialogue with Theology 
Tipler describes his so-called „physics of immortality‟ as a new kind of natural theology, 
which resists metaphysical or transcendental claims in lieu of what he regards to be a 
thoroughly materialistic and scientifically verifiable system  He is aware that his physical 
theology seriously impacts confessional theological belief, but argues that his thesis resonates 
deeply with „contemporary protestant theology.‟ In particular he cites the work of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, noting that Pannenberg believes that the identity of the „present-day person is 
coded not only in the present-day spatio-temporal structure, but also in God‟ (Tipler 1994, 
293).  Tipler sees Pannenberg‟s understanding of eschatological personhood to be the same as 
his own „Omega Point Theory‟, where information about the person will be reconstructed at 
the Omega Point (end of the universe).  Though one may bristle at what appears to be the co-
opting of Pannenberg‟s theology for the purposes of Tipler‟s posthuman speculative science; 
it would appear that Tipler‟s interpretation of Pannenberg may not be that far from the truth, 
as on his website he refers to personal correspondence with Pannenberg where Pannenberg 
offers the following veiled endorsement of Tipler‟s theories:  
Christian believers and their resurrection hope need not the difficult path towards 
resurrection via a change of the basis of intellectual life from old-fashioned organic 
life to a computer based life that might finally dominate in the universe. Communion 
with the crucified and risen Christ, who according to the Christian faith at present 
already participates in God‟s rule of the universe, is sufficient for the Christian as 
basis of the hope in their future participation in the resurrection of the dead. That does 
not exclude that the development of life in the universe may indeed take the course 
which Tipler describes (Pannenberg 1997). 
Despite Pannenberg‟s guarded approval of Tipler‟s work, there are serious issues which 
prohibit confessional theology from closely aligning itself with this approach.  The least of 
which is the apparent elevation of human technique to the point of ultimacy.  This is a 
tendency which seems endemic to Tipler‟s theology. 
Much like Moravec and Kurzweil who regard the digital transformation of human being 
as the inevitable next step in human evolution, Tipler posits that „the creation of such 
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intelligent machines will be a matter not of “man playing God,” but rather, of humanity 
ensuring a union with God‟ (Tipler 1994, 21).  This is to say, that upon enveloping the whole 
of the cosmos with intelligent life, humanity will become omnipresent, omniscient, 
omnitemporal, and as far as it is allowed for within the omega point, omnipotent (Tipler 1994, 
153f).  Thus, humanity itself, by using its technology to seed intelligence into the cosmos, 
becomes God.  Tipler‟s God is no monolithic divine, but rather an emergent characteristic 
which develops within the evolving life forms of the cosmos.  For Tipler, God only exists in 
as much as humanity possesses the potential to become God.   
In a critique of Pannenberg‟s acceptance of Tipler, Sjored L. Bonting notes that the 
theology argued for by Tipler is inherently inauthentic because it confuses the roles of science 
and theology.  Theology, according to Bonting, is concerned only with transcendental ideas 
whereas science is „by definition limited to this world‟ (Bonting 2005).  Bonting goes on to 
argue that Tipler is unable to construct a valid theology, because his scientific language is 
unable to discuss the transcendental object of theology.   Pannenberg rightly sees the limits of 
Bonting‟s critique: if science is the language of the world and cannot speak of the divine, it 
follows that theology, the language of the divine, is limited in its ability to speak  to the 
world.  Such an impotent theology contradicts the cosmic implications of Christian 
eschatological hope which demands universal import (Pannenberg 2005).  Though I agree 
with Pannenberg‟s assessment of Bonting, I cannot follow his endorsement of Tipler, no 
matter how caged it may appear.  Principally, I believe that Tipler‟s „science‟ is merely a 
capitulation to an essentialist philosophy of technology that has led Tipler into a form of 
cybernetic totalism.  As such, his work, though clearly a significant intellectual exercise, is 
more a reflection of an uncritical reading of technology than it is a lasting bridge between 
science and theology.   
By making the human or posthuman subject a potentially infinite entity, and by making 
the means of this transformation human technical aptitude, posthuman speculative science 
advocates a purely immanentist theology which grounds hope (theological or otherwise) on 
speculated technological mythologies rather than hoped-for transcendental symbols.  A 
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Biblical cosmic eschatology, places as a mark over future human history the ultimate power 
of God as the source and sustainers of life, and the determined yet unknowable plan of God to 
control the ends of history.  It is, to echo the words of Hans Schwarz, a countermeasure 
against the contemporary obsession with the present (Schwarz 2000, 2).  The techno-
theological eschatology of posthuman speculative science transforms eschatology itself into a 
technology which is controllable, controlling, and de-mystified.   
 
Kurzweil’s Spiritual Machines and the pursuit of the Singularity 
We conclude this investigation of posthuman speculative science by briefly looking at the 
work of futurologist and entrepreneur Ray Kurzweil.  Like Moravec and Tipler, Kurzweil 
approaches the inevitability of the posthuman union of technology and humanity as the next 
step in human evolution and, significantly, as the solution to the problem of personal human 
death.  Also consistent with others discussed in this article, despite his extreme faith in the 
future capacity of technology, Kurzweil is no crack-pot futurologist, but an established and 
highly respected engineer, entrepreneur, and inventor.
vii
  As is attested to by his early work, 
the majority of Kurzweil‟s life has been spent imagining and developing technologies aimed 
directly at improving deficiencies in human physiology.  His work in recent years has 
transitioned from research into the palliative application of cybernetic technologies to 
alleviate visual and auditory disabilities, to the more systematically curative application of 
technology enlisted to overcome personal death.  The trajectory of his thinking can be traced 
in his three principal works: The Age of Intelligent Machines (1989), The Age of Spiritual 
Machines (1999) and most recently, the ambitiously titled, The Fantastic Voyage: Live Long 
Enough to Live Forever (2004).   
Technology, for Kurzweil is an essential element of human being and is intimately 
connected with human evolution.  Distinct from a tool – a device which according to 
Kurzweil is fashioned only to attend to the needs of a particular job – technologies are objects 
that are interwoven with human culture and destiny, persisting beyond the needs of the 
moment.  They are the bearers of cultural information, inasmuch as the development of 
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technology implies the progression and development of ideas from one successive generation 
to the next.  He writes: 
Technology goes beyond the mere fashioning and use of tools.  It involves a record of 
tool making and a progression in the sophistication of tools.  It requires invention and 
is itself a continuation of evolution by other means.  The “genetic code” of the 
evolutionary process of technology is the record maintained by the tool-making 
species (Kurzweil 1999, 14). 
Like Moravec, who considered humanity to be a „half-breed‟ species partially composed 
of a technological body and partially composed of a biological body; Kurzweil points to a 
twofold evolutionary process which, in creating humans and technology, anticipates the 
synergistic human-technology merger of the „technology-inventing species with the 
computational technology it initiated the creation of‟ (Kurzweil 1999, 255-6). This event is 
described by Kurzweil as the singularity, the point at which human-technology evolution will 
converge and accelerate to infinite progress.   
For Kurzweil, this human-technology merger will result in the creation of two distinct 
types of mind: an artificial mind which will emerge from the computer itself and a subjective 
mind which is transferred from the substrate of the human brain to the substrate of the 
computer.  Thus, the title of his principal book, The Spiritual Age of Machines, reflects both 
the emergence of an independent machine-mind and the spiritual instantiation of the human 
mind in the computers of the future.  Such machines, for Kurzweil, would consider 
themselves to be fully human, „although their brains are not based on carbon-based cellular 
processes, but rather electronic and photonic “equivalents”„ (Kurzweil 1999, 234).  More than 
simply artificial intelligence (an attribute which he believes can be ascribed to current 
computers), Kurzweil argues that his spiritual machines will possess a true self awareness and 
consciousness which he regards as being functionally equivalent to the human mind.  
Eventually into such machines, human mind itself could be uploaded.     
He couches his analysis of future technologies within a speculated trajectory of future 
computer developments, which are based upon his understanding of the past rate at which 
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computer technology has advanced.  Important to his argument is the constancy of what is 
referred to as Moore‟s Law, an informal rule of computer technology which predicts that the 
number of transistors per square inch of an integrated circuit will double every 24 months 
(Moore 1965).  Graham Moore, the co-founder of the microprocessor manufacturer Intel, 
made this prediction in 1965 based upon the increased density of integrated circuits since 
their inception in 1959.  Although Moore predicted that this trend would continue into the 
foreseeable future, most experts (including Moore himself), do not hold this law to be an 
eternal constant (See also: Dertouzos 2000, 26).  Kurzweil, however, bases the entirety of his 
speculative science on the constancy of Moore‟s Law, which he believes will allow for 
development in technologies leading to the rise of spiritual machines.    
Kurzweil promotes his argument by predicting a gradual internalisation of computer 
technology into the human subject.  For  Kurzweil, as was the case with Moravec, the clunky 
material interfaces which separate one‟s consciousness from the activities going on within 
one‟s computer will continue to disappear as technologies develop.  What began with the 
erasure of wires connecting computer peripherals and computer networks will, in Kurzweil‟s 
speculation, lead to the eventual disappearance of keyboards (Kurzweil 1999, 277).  The 
present-day drive to develop increasingly unobtrusive computer displays, will lead to 
immersive virtual environments made possible first by ocular implants then finally brain 
implants (Kurzweil 1999, 279).  This will be accomplished as the division between 
flesh/blood and copper/silicon becomes ever confused as one‟s experience of the „real‟ world 
slowly becomes indistinguishable from one‟s emersion within the „virtual‟ world.  
Subjectively it is then only a matter of making a final jump from the mind‟s instantiation 
within the physical body to the mind‟s instantiation within a machine (Kurzweil 1999, 51-4).  
This is, for Kurzweil, „when we become software‟ (Kurzweil 1999, 150). 
Critique of Kurzweil’s Speculative Science 
Kurzweil, like Tipler and Moravec, appeals to the problem of human finality as the 
impetuous for his technological eschatology.  He defends his radical hope by arguing that in 
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light of the general antipathy towards death evidenced by the contemporary anti-death 
industries of medicine and life-extension, the pursuit of a final technical solution to death is 
simply inevitable.  Thus, Kurzweil arrives at something like the „cosmological argument‟ for 
the existence of spiritual machines: Because we need to overcome death, our technology must 
be able to facilitate our need.  Kurzweil never doubts the ability of technology to develop to a 
sufficiently robust state where it can accommodate and resolve this need.  Indeed, he predicts 
that in the 21st century, with the help of strong AI and advanced computer technology, „the 
human species, along with the computational technology it created, will be able to offer 
succour to human needs and desires, and will be in a position to change the nature of 
mortality in a postbiological future‟ (Kurzweil 1999, 2). 
Thus, salvation for present humanity is to be found not in some distant eschaton, but in 
the move towards a posthuman and postbiological future.  Whereas Tipler oriented his 
physical eschatology towards the Omega Point, Kurzweil‟s eternal kingdom fixes its gaze on 
the far more immanent goal of what he terms the „singularity‟.  For Kurzweil, the 
postbiological age will reach its climax at a moment of rapid technological change which 
culminates in a vast dispersal of „immortal software-based humans, and ultra-high levels of 
intelligence‟ into the whole of the cosmos travelling, „at the speed of light‟ (Kurzweil, 2001).  
This idea resonates with both Moravec and Tipler, and signals not only the ultimate salvation 
of human consciousnesses, but more profoundly, the universal significance of human 
technology which when dispersed into the cosmos will begin rectifying even the problem of 
cosmic finitude, a la Tipler.  Thus it would seem that Kurzweil‟s Manichean vision, like that 
of the other posthuman scientists discussed here, places its hope on the pure dispersal of 
human mind into the cosmos as the goal of evolution and the key to cosmic salvation (c.f. 
Asimov [1956] 1990) 
I regard the freeing of the human mind from its severe physical limitations of scope 
and duration as the necessary next step in evolution. Evolution, in my view, 
represents the purpose of life. That is, the purpose of life -- and of our lives -- is to 
evolve (Kurzweil 2001). 
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Unlike Christian eschatology, Kurzweil‟s immortal posthuman and postbiological future 
circumvents the need for the divine, by giving the individual the ultimate degree of „power 
and depth‟ in shaping this future (Kurzweil 1999, 153).  For Kurzweil, human technology is 
the medium by which human mind can be liberated from its bondage within an ever decaying 
body.  Evolution is the means by which pure spirit is freed into the cosmos.   
Though The Age of Spiritual Machines was written over six years ago, Kurzweil still 
maintains his commitment to this vision of the postbiological future.  In his recent work, The 
Fantastic Voyage, Kurzweil frames his futurological speculations within easily-applicable 
common sense health practices which are aimed at assisting the living to survive until the 
future day when spiritual machines are able to host human minds.  The book lays out a 
holistic strategy of diet, weight-loss, and smart lifestyle choices that can extend human life 
until „radical life-extension‟ technologies become available.  For Kurzweil wise, „lifestyle 
choices will maximise‟ one‟s ability to live long enough to „take full advantage of the radical 
life-extending therapies that lie just ahead‟ (Kurzweil and Grossman 2004, 260).   
Conclusion 
The examples from posthuman speculative science discussed in this article can be 
critiqued on a variety of grounds – technical, socio-political, psychological, biological and 
philosophical (de Mul 2003, 247; Fukuyama 2003, 168).  With regards to theology, we have 
illustrated three principal mistakes made by posthuman speculative science:  1) a positivistic 
certainty in the future abilities of information technology to facilitate a techno-theological 
eschatology; 2) an uncritical acceptance of the myth of technology and technological 
progress; 3) the view that technology, as myth, can facilitate ultimate concern.  The problem 
underlying these three principal errors is the elevation of the individual‟s life over and against 
the life of others.  The belief in radical life extension within posthuman speculative science is 
an active denial of death which reveals what is an ultimately selfish and self-centred 
enterprise.  As Fukuyama notes:  „A person who has not confronted suffering or death has no 
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depth.  Our ability to experience these emotions is what connects us potentially to all other 
human beings, both living and dead‟ (Fukuyama 2003, 173).   
According to Elaine Graham, posthuman thinkers pursue through technology what can be 
characterised as the „technological sublime‟ which is rooted in a „fear of contingency and 
finitude.‟  Though posthumanism may appear to seek after the transcendent in a manner that 
is akin to Christian eschatology, the posthuman agenda is always channelled through human 
materiality and never allowed to constructively emerge as an authentic source of hope.  
Rather than authentic transcendence, the futurological emphasis of posthuman speculative 
science is ultimately unable to escape the world within which it is situated.  The attempt to 
engage technology in transcendental purposes fails to situate human technology or „human 
energies‟ in the productive „activity of world-building‟ (Graham 2002, 17).   
A final question to be explored here at the conclusion of this article is,  How does the 
myth of this technological eschatology contrast with Christian eschatology?  The final written 
words of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, „This is the end – for me the beginning of life‟ (Bonhoeffer 
1967, 225), reflects the mysterious relationship which Christian eschatology has to the reality 
of personal death.  Death is not something to be scorned, rejected, or postponed for an 
indefinite amount of time.  As intimated by Bonhoeffer, the Christian reaction to death is one 
of victory over death.  Pauline eschatology hails the mystery of imperishablity for those in 
Christ for whom „Death has been swallowed up in victory‟ (1 Corinthians 15.55).   
Posthuman eschatological hopes are at best for a radical extension of life.  Yet the 
postponement of death is quite a different from the idea of death being conquered or 
vanquished, as a whole.  Paul‟s laud of victory over death is saturated in Christological 
overtones.  Death is made impotent because it has been conquered by Christ‟s own movement 
through death to resurrection.  It is by following Christ‟s example that Paul admonishes his 
readers to be confident in their own fate through death.  Indeed, for the Christian the 
avoidance of death is tantamount to an avoidance of salvation.  At the end of posthuman life 
extension, death postponed still awaits its claim.  Christian eschatology paradoxically calls 
death a defeated foe and embraces death as the transition into life eternal, as it is the symbolic 
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means by which eternity is realised through the resurrection of the body.  Unlike the Hebrew 
Bible which lauds mythic longevity as a sign of divine blessing (such as Melchizadek in 
Genesis 14, who in the story is said to have lived for over 900 years), Christianity needs death 
for the transformation that is a transfiguration of the fleshly body.  It is hubris and an 
obsession with the present that encourages posthuman speculative science to avoid death at all 
possible costs.   
Technology, when allowed to become the normative force by which humanity 
understands itself and its destiny, distorts the humanist or religious pursuit of the good.   
Despite claims reflecting a hope for a real technologically embittered future,  the posthuman 
ideology has more to do with a general drive towards technological conversion – bespeaking 
the acceptance of a technological worldview – than it does with actual physical 
transformation.  For theology, it represents a contradicting theological model, which 
reinterprets the message of salvation that has traditionally been offered to humanity in other 
more explicitly mythological (or religious) forms.  According to N. Katherine Hayles, „People 
become posthuman because they think they are posthuman‟ (Hayles 1999, 6).   
Rather than denying the technologies which make posthuman rhetoric possible, society 
must embrace „the possibilities of information technology without being seduced by the 
fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied immortality‟ (Hayles 1999, 5).  As such, the 
place of technology must be grounded in life lived in community and governed by shard 
narratives and common values.  The posthuman drive to undermine finitude as a defining 
characteristic of human life undermines present humanity for the sake of a distant 
posthumanity.   
For theology, a productive engagement with technology starts by a move away from the 
blind faith of the posthuman myth of unceasing technological progress, and a move towards a 
hermeneutics of technology that centres on a concern for a technology‟s appropriateness.  
This indicates a transition away from the techno-theology of IT culture towards a theology of 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 Such technological essentialism can trace its post-war lineage back to Martin Heidegger‟s, "The 
Question Concerning Technology," ; Jacques Ellul‟s, The Technological Society, or even Albert 
Borgmann‟s Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life.  In these three examples, 
technology is characterised by a dominative essence which controls the culture in which it is 
operated.  An essentialist philosophy of technology curtails any hope for redemptive 
engagement with technologies, as the reified Technology is removed from particular 
representations in individual technologies, the very location from which one could 
constructively approach an ethics of technological practices.   
ii
 Compare the demand for signs by the Pharisees in Mark 8.11-12, with the signs of false messiahs 
(Mark 13.22), and the sign of the betrayer (Mark 14.44).  Contrast this with the signs of the 
Kingdom, given to the believers (Mark 16.17) and intelligible by believers (Mark 16.20).  
iii
 Note the privileged place of computational models of information in Tom Stonier, Beyond 
Information; the computational models of consciousness advocated by  Marvin Minsky, The 
Society of Mind; and similarly the component model of consciousness in Daniel C. Dennett, 
Consciousness Explained.  
iv
 Apart from Andrew Crumey‟s Mobius Dick, which teases out the implications of such an outlandish 
claim.   
v
 See Moravec‟s work with the SEEGRID corporation: http://www.seegrid.com/pages/about.html.  In 
particular: Moravec‟s efforts to develop three dimensional navigation in automated mobile 
robotics has most recently explored the problems associated with colour perception in the 
artificial eye (Moravec 2001).  
vi
 Subjective immortality is distinct from objective immorality in Tipler because he distinguishes 
between the real time of the cosmos and the subjective time experienced by life or the living.  
The former is bound by the cosmic horizon of the omega point, whereas the latter is bound only 
by the internal facilities of an information processing device.  Thus, cosmic subjective 
immortality exists when the mind becomes persisted within a medium that is sufficiently robust 
enough to generate apparently endless experiences of subject temporality, which Tipler sees as 
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being possible if the mind is instantiated within fabric of the cosmos itself, at Omega Point 
(Tipler 1994, 138). 
vii
 Kurzweil developed the first print-to-speech reading device utilising optical character recognition 
(OCR), the first character recognising flat-bed scanner, the first text-to-speech synthesizer, the 
first music synthesizer capable of recreating the grand piano and other orchestral instruments, 
and the first commercially viable speech recognition device.  His foresight and innovation have 
earned him many awards and honours, including the Lemelson-MIT Prize, the world's largest 
award in invention and innovation; the 1999 National Medal of Technology, the United State‟s 
highest honour in technology awarded from former US-President President Clinton; the 1994 
Dickson Prize (Carnegie Mellon University's top science prize), Engineer of the Year from 
Design News, Inventor of the Year from M.I.T., and the Grace Murray Hopper Award from the 
Association for Computing Machinery.    
